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ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze the minority game for patients, and the results known from the minority 
game are applied to the patient problem consulted at the department of pediatric 
cardiology. We find numerically the standard deviation and the global efficiency, similar 
to the El Farol bar problem. After the score equation and the scaled utility are 
introduced, the dynamical behavior of our model is discussed for particular strategies. 
Our result presented will be compared with the well-known minority games. 
 
 
PACS numbers: 05.20.-y, 89.65.64, 84.35.+i 
Keywords: Minority game, El Farol bar problem, Score equation, Scaling utility 
 
 
*Corresponding author. Tel.: +82-51-620-6354; fax: +82-51-611-6357. 
E-mail address: kskim@pknu.ac.kr. 
 
 
 
Recently, the investigation of the minority game [1,2] between economists and 
physicists has received considerable attention as one interdisciplinary field. Until now, 
there has been mainly concentrated on evolutionary minority games [3-5], adaptive 
minority games [6,7], and multi-choice minority games [8]. Particularly, these studies 
can lead to a better understanding for scaling properties based on novel statistical 
methods and approaches of economics. Many econophysicists have considered several 
ways of rewarding the agents strategies and compared the resulting behaviors of the 
configurations in minority game theory. Interestingly, de Almeida and Menche [8] have 
investigated two options rewarded in standard minority games that choose adaptive 
genetic algorithms, and their result is found to come close to that of standard minority 
games.  
Furthermore, Arthors model [1] was even more influenced to the well-known seller 
and buyers model in financial markets and to the passenger problem in the metro and 
bus. In this paper, we apply the minority game theory to the numbers of both general 
patients and reserved patients who were consulted at the department of pediatric 
cardiology in the Korean hospital of Hanyang university for one year (from January 
2002 to December 2002). For the sake of simplicity, we focus the discussion to 
numerically the standard deviation and the global efficiency, and we limit ourselves to 
the study the score equation and the scaled utility for particular strategies of our model.  
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In our patients problem, we will assume that the patients N = 157 can decide 
independently whether to go or not to the hospital, which the doctor can consult xm = 
(N-1)/2 patients, i.e., the possible number of consulted patients, in a day. It is predicted 
that the doctor can consult them if agents become smaller then xm. Patients are inductive 
rational agents, so that the patient does not want to go to his consulting department 
when the hospital is crowded. We apply S different strategies to predict whether the 
patient will be consulted or not, based on the past consulted patients. The minority game 
theory, formerly introducing by Challet and Zhang [2], is applied to the dynamical 
behavior of our model. At each round R, N agents (patients) choose one among two 
possible options, i.e., 1 and 0 (the score that the patient is decided to go or not to the 
hospital). The agents win (lose) if it belongs to be smaller (larger) than xm, and their 
action behaves independently without any communication or interaction. All available 
rounds. There are 2 possible values for each of the m memories and there are 
memories. So there exists different strategies, for example 256 
strategies in the case of m= 3 .   
A statistical qua
information is  other patints actions, that is, the memory of the past m 
 
ntity in the minority game is the standard deviation defined by 
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where θ(x) is the Heaviside function, i.e., θ(x)=1 for x >0 and θ(x)=0 for x <0. The 
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here R is the total number of rounds, Ni(p) is the number of agents 
playing (p) in round i. 
In our patient mode
neral patients and (2) both general and reserved patients. We will assume that one 
round is the consulted time for one day, and all total rounds are R=293, neglecting time 
intervals of the hospital closure. In first case, the result of standard deviations for the 
general patients is shown in Fig.2, which is the plot of the standard deviation σ versus m 
for the strategies S=2 and 4. It is found that the minimum value of σ is 1.56 at m=6 for 
S=2, and that it approaches to the value σ = 2.19 (dot line) as m goes to be larger. From 
the dispersion σ2, the global efficiency σ2/N has a minimum value at a (= 2m/N)=0.217 
for S=2 in Fig.3, while it obtained the same value a = 0.34 in the El Farol bar and 
interacting heterogeneous model [9]. 
In second case, let us discuss the g
served patients for strategy S=2. Fig.4 shows the standard deviation σ as a function of 
the round m for strategy S=2. Then, the minimum value σ is 1.10 at m=6 and k=20, 
where k is the percentage of reserved patients. As shown in Fig.5, the global efficiency 
has a minimum value at m=6 for strategy S=2 and k=20. This is an optimal situation for 
utilizing the hospital equipments the case of all patients including 20% reserved patients. 
Next, let us ES,k(t) denote the score at the time step t for the consulted patients per 
aximum patients k and the strategy S. Since one round get the payoff if the prediction 
is consistent with the past recorded memory, the score equation is defined as 
variation xm = (N-1)/2 is the maximum number of consulted patients, xte predicted 
agents, and xt the number of agents chosen one particular action. As well-known, it will 
be rewarded with one(zero) point if a strategy is right(wrong) in Eq. (2). Fig.6 shows 
the score function of consulted patients for S=2 and the rounds m= 2-7 for one year. It is 
found that the score function becomes a larger value, as R goes to be larger and m→7. 
Lastly we define the scaled utility U( xt ) [7] as a function xt as follows: 
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The scaled utility at the strategy S=2 for one year is plotted in Fig.7. When the highest 
number of patints is consulted, the scaled utility has a maximum value U( xt = xm or xm 
+1)=1. The patients model is more efficient, as the value of the scaled utility approaches 
to one or the deviations from the maximum utility is small.  
In conclusions, we have discussed the minority game theory for all patients included 
reserved patients who were consulted at the department of pediatric cardiology in the 
Korean hospital of Hanyang university for one year. For strategy S=2 and k=20, the 
global efficiency has a minimum value at the round m=6. In particular, we conclude that 
we can get the optimal situation for utilizing the hospital equipments in the case of all 
patients including 20% reserved patients. In future, this result will extend to other 
departments of Korean hospital, and it is also expected that the detail description of the 
minority game theory will be used to study the extension of financial analysis in Korean 
financial markets. 
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FIGURE  CAPTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1  The number N of consulted patients for one year (R =293 days), where the dot 
line is the value of xm = (N-1)/2 and the maximum number of agents is N = 157. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2  Plot of the standard deviation σ versus m for the strategies S=2 and 4, where the 
dot line is the value of 2.19 and the minimum value of σ is 1.56 at m=6 for S=2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3  Plot of the global efficiency σ2/N versus 2m/N ,where the value of the dot line is 
-1.78 and the minimum value of σ2/N is 2.08 at a (= 2m/N )=0.217 for the strategy S=2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4  Plot of the standard deviation σ versus m for strategy S=2, where the dot line is 
the value of 2.19 and the minimum σ is 1.10 at m=6 and k=20 ( k is the percentage of 
reserved patients). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5  Plot of the global efficiency σ2/N versus 2m/N ,where the value of the dot line is 
-1.78 and the minimum value of σ2/N is 2.37 at 2m/N =0.217 for k=20 and S=2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6  The score function of consulted patients for S=2 and the round m= 2-7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.7  The scaled utility of consulted patients at the strategy S=2 for one year.  
 
